نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
The traditional structure of commercial firms, based on a fixed-wage system, generally reduces labor (L) to a mere cost variable and allocates the value added exclusively to financial capital (K). This approach, particularly in knowledge-intensive firms, leads to the exacerbation of conflicts of interest (within the framework of agency theory) and the emergence of moral hazard. By critiquing the fixed-wage system from the perspective of Islamic economics and explaining the inadequacy of classical Islamic participatory contracts in compensating for the inter-temporal spillover of human capital, the current study proposes the “Adaptive Labor Shares” model. The objective of this model is to establish a dynamic alignment between the true contribution of each input in creating value added and its share in the profit, management, and ownership of the firm.
To this end, through the continuous distribution of shares, an “adaptive share portfolio” is formed which, despite creating a dilution effect in relative value, guarantees labor’s interests through the accumulation of participation tenure and absolute value growth. Furthermore, to overcome the free-rider problem in team production, the model utilizes a “horizontal peer monitoring” mechanism based on hierarchical pairwise comparisons. Simultaneously, through symmetrical risk distribution, it optimizes the risk-adjusted return for investors. Findings indicate that implementing this model and establishing a balance between labor and capital flows, while eliminating labor alienation and enhancing internal supervision, leads to a novel architecture in corporate governance and the equitable allocation of value based on Islamic economics; an achievement whose practical implementation necessitates a new paradigm in corporate law and the development of novel corporate accounting models.
کلیدواژهها English