Document Type : Research Article
Authors
1
Faculty of Economics, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran
2
Associate Professor, Faculty of Islamic Studies and Economics, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran
3
*** Assistant Professor, Faculty of Theology, Islamic Studies and Guidance, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran
10.30497/ies.2026.250201.2363
Abstract
Abstract:
Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCo Bonds) are among the financial instruments that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, aimed at enhancing banks’ loss-absorbing capacity and reducing the banking system’s reliance on bailouts. Under normal conditions, these instruments are recorded as liabilities on banks’ balance sheets; however, in times of financial distress, they contribute to capital restoration through mechanisms such as coupon cancellation, conversion into equity, or principal write-down.
Despite these functions, their conventional structure—due to its debt-based nature and reliance on interest-bearing obligations, as well as features such as mandatory conversion, principal write-down, coupon cancellation, non-cumulative coupons, and call options—raises serious Sharia concerns within Islamic banking.
This study employs a descriptive-analytical method based on library research to examine the Sharia aspects of this instrument and its applicability in the banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The findings indicate that while CoCo Bonds in their conventional form are not fully acceptable within Islamic banking, their economic rationale can be reconstructed within a Sharia-compliant framework.
Accordingly, adopting a feature-based approach, the paper analyzes key components—including the issuance basis, conversion mechanism, principal write-down, coupon suspension trigger, non-cumulative coupons, and call option—from the perspective of Imami (Ja‘fari) jurisprudence. It then proposes a model based on "conditionally convertible special investment deposit certificates structured under a Wakalah (agency) contract," with proceeds allocated to an identifiable and traceable investment activity or project.
The results suggest that by moving away from an interest-based debt structure, prioritizing conversion into equity over principal write-down, defining returns based on actual investment activities under Wakalah, and carefully structuring contractual conditions, a Sharia-compliant model for this instrument can be developed. However, its implementation in Iran’s banking system requires clear regulatory frameworks, precise contractual design, and effective supervisory mechanisms to prevent formalistic or non-substantive compliance.
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